Here's a little article by me on the 50th anniversary of Ulster Day, back in 1962:
My name is Marc Mulholland. I am a Fellow (lecturer and tutor) in the History Faculty of Oxford University. My College is St Catherine's. I come from Ireland.
This is a blog relating to my book published in 2012 by Oxford University Press, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservativism. Now on sale here and here. If you want 20 per cent off the price, I can arrange that! Send me a message or leave a comment, and I'll tell you how.
The thesis my book is examining was rather pithily summarised by Leon Trotsky in 1939: "Wherever the proletariat appeared as an independent force, the bourgeoisie shifted to the camp of the counter-revolution. The bolder the struggle of the masses, the quicker the reactionary transformation of liberalism." [Context is here]
However, my book isn't a defence of Trotskyism, or indeed any particular ideology. It's a study of an idea that took shape in Left, Right, and Centre variations.
This blog has tid-bits not included in the book, and other thoughts that occur.
You can see book details at the OUP website.
Saturday, 29 September 2012
Here's a little article by me on the 50th anniversary of Ulster Day, back in 1962:
Friday, 28 September 2012
Evans' article has a particularly fine comparison of Berlin and Munich in the post-Great War years. Well worth reading
Thursday, 27 September 2012
First: 'bourgeois liberty':
The fight of the [ the liberal movement] against feudal aristocracy and absolute monarchyn ... became more earnest.This, Marx said, was "silly" because
By this, the long-wished for opportunity was offered to 'True' Socialism of confronting the political movement with the Socialist demands, of hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois movement.
To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country squires, and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.
It was a sweet finish, after the bitter pills of flogging and bullets, with which these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working-class risings
(Interesting this. Marx here is defending 'bourgeois liberties'. However, he also seems to suggest that they will be transcended, and that their primary value is in helping the workers movement. It's maybe a one-all draw in the 'was Marx a democratric constitutionalist' debate).
While this “True” Socialism thus served the government as a weapon for fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a reactionary interest, the interest of German Philistines.
Second: 'politics of fear':
A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of communism.To find out what did get in the book, buy it at Amazon, or if you're in town you can now find it in the Oxford University Bookshop.
Wednesday, 26 September 2012
Why not see what you make of it?
Tuesday, 25 September 2012
Chris isn't optimistic that Milliband's first hashing out of the concept does much more than gloss Labour's adherence to austerity. That's looks to be true, though I share Martin O'Neill's view that raising the topic at all in this way is quite a break-through in itself.
Criticism on the Left of post hoc re-distribution isn't new, of course. In the 1830s, Louis Blanc (1811-1882) wrote scathingly that as "competition produces misery" and the "fecundity of the poor throws upon society wretched beings who want work, and cannot find work", so we ultimately arrive "at this pitch, society can only choose between killing the poor out of the way, or supporting them gratuitously - that is between atrocity and folly."
[Louis Blanc's l'Organization du Travail (1839), trans. by James Ward in Louis Blanc on the Working Classes: With Corrected Notes, and a Refutation of his Destructive Plan (London, 1848), p. 83].
Obviously Blanc wanted to avoid atrocity and folly. Blanc was a moderate, relatively speaking, who believed in gradual reform and the avoidance of violence or class conflict. Unlike the hyper-statist Saint-Simonians, however, he was passionately committed to democracy and the universal (male0 suffrage. This, he believed, would transform the state into an instrument for progress.
The democratic ‘social republic’ would not take over and plan the economy, but rather would facilitate cooperative production by associations of workers. Starting-up capital would be provided to Ateliers Nationaux (national workshops) which, as they attracted skilled, well motivated workers, would soon stand on their own feet. The State would provide a binding 'code' for the Ateliers, but after a year's midwifery no longer directly intervene. Workers would run the associations themselves.
The associations would generally handle necessary welfare provision which, along with the ‘right to work’, would give labour the security of a private property. The monopoly of capital in the hands of employers would be ended, and in due course capitalist enterprises would dwindle as wage-labourers decamped to become cooperative producers in the Ateliers.
Blanc's ideas were resuscitated by Ferdinand Lassalle in the 1860s (to Marx's grief, as he could see no good coming from the Prussian state), and by the early Fabians in the 1880s. Fabian Essays (1888) argued that some industries such as railways should be taken into state control for reasons of technical efficiency, and if a capitalist enterprise acquired national monopoly status, it should be taken over (compensation being paid) by the state. In general, however, County and other Councils were expected to set up socialised enterprises in competition with capitalist outfits; being free of charges for rent and interest, they would be easily competitive. In the main, capitalist enterprises would be squeezed out of the market rather than taken over. Socialised enterprises, firstly for public works (roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, housing, public utility services), ultimately establishing farms and factories, would ensure employment and establish the socialist ‘right to work’.
In contrast to Blanc and Lassalle, however, in the relevant essay by Annie Besant, the idea of workers’ control of their industries was rejected. Instead, government authorities should appoint managers and boards; usually, of course, local government authorities for local and regional public enterprises. Later on, Guild Socialist Fabians around G.D.H. Cole tried to bring back in the idea of workers' control, but within a pluralist system of countervailing powers (consumers, trades unions, etc.).
The late Paul Hirst thought about these ideas a lot, and his notions of 'associative democracy' might well be worth revisting for 'pre-distributionists' now.
Monday, 24 September 2012
In general, David argues, a 'caste-balance' is a good thing. In the 1920s, and since 1970s, buccaneering 'merchants' have been hegemonic, with inegalitarian and de-stabilising results. Priestland looks back quite fondly to the post-war golden age of rapid growth and welfarism (whilst admitting its grave problems). Then a coalition of worker and 'sage' held the quick-buck market at bay. (This is quite similar, though with different terms employed, to the analysis in Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy's analysis in The Crisis of Neoliberalism (2010); they spoke more of a worker/manger alliance against finance-capital, which they hope to see re-instituted.)
David treats of a lot of themes I look at in my book, though I stick to more of a 'class' framework (tweaked about). I'll not judge whether that this following is also a difference, but David's prose really zips along! He's particularly adept at using portraits of individuals to illustrate wider themes.
There's some very intriguing data employed. For example, David cites the work of Graham Turner, which claims that had Britain and America not let domestic debt rip between 1997 and 2007 (private and government both, presumably), consumption would have been 20 percent lower! (p. 243).
Anyway, it's an outstandingly interesting, well-written and thought-provoking book. Highly recommended!
David's also got an article in the Guardian for you to take a gander at.
Tuesday, 18 September 2012
My paper, on Friday, is called, "Violent Revolutionism and ‘Dual Power’ in Postwar Europe: Soviets, Räte, Dáil".
Will I get it all in within the allotted span of 20 minutes?
I expect more of the same in Sleepwalkers. The blurb suggests that Clark wishes to re-think the historiographical consensus throws almost the entire blame upon German aggression and miscalculation for pitching a basically stable European states system into catastrophic war. Rather, says Clark, Europe was a "multipolar, fractured, multicultural world of clashing ideals, terrorism, militancy and instability ... saddled with a conspicuously ineffectual set of political leaders". He also points out that in its own terms, Gavrilo Princip's assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was staggeringly efficient. It actually succeeded in destroying the Hapsburg Empire and creating a greater Serbia. But at what cost!
In his biography of Wilhelm II, Clark noted that, following the assassination, "Vienna's demands [for restitution from Serbia] look distinctly undraconian from a contemporary standpoint - they represented considerably less of an incursion upon Berlgrade's sovereign prerogatives than those set before the Serb delegation at Rambouillet in 1999 - and the Serb reply was less accommodating than has often been asserted."[pp. 303-4] It wasn't all blind or cynical lashing out by the Central Powers.
It's this kind of food for thought that puts Clark's newest book top of my end of Summer reading list.
Monday, 17 September 2012
On Book Depository, on the other hand, it has gone from full price to 25 percent off.
Anyone understand pre-publications price gyrations? Presumably it's all computerised?
I have flyers from OUP offering 20 per cent off. If you would like one, feel free to get in touch.
Thursday, 13 September 2012
This was a key turning-point as I discuss it in my book. Rather provocatively, I said it came "closest to being the most striking example of an archetypal bourgeois revolution".
Partly this claim depends upon my definition of 'bourgeoisie', which is neither as just a disparate rag-bag twixt gentry and labourers, nor a super cohesive class of capitalists. Rather, it is a class category bound by a common interest in what we'd call 'meritocracy'.
There's an interesting section on the dispute in F. L. Carsten's study re-published in his Essays in German History (London: the Hambledon Press, 1985):
The army conflict in Prussia was at the same time a social conflict between a rising middle class and a declining nobility. This was clearly perceived at the time. Thus the historian of the foundation of the German Empire of 1871, Professor von Sybel, said in 1862: 'in internal affairs, the great conflict of our time is not a conflict between Crown and parliament, but one between the excessive privileges of the nobility and the free right of merit.' Another moderate Liberal declared: 'it is a struggle about principles ... a struggle of the burghers versus the Junkers.' ['Bismarck and the Prussian Liberals', p. 239]It's a nice little paragraph. Too late for the book, but I submit it for your consideration.
Wednesday, 12 September 2012
The emancipation of the productive class is that of all human beings without distinction of sex or race;
The producers can be free only when they are in possession of the means of productionThat there are only two forms under which the means of production can belong to them
This collective appropriation can arise only from the revolutionary action of the productive class – or proletariat - organized in a distinct political party;
- The individual form which has never existed in a general state and which is increasingly eliminated by industrial progress;
- The collective form the material and intellectual elements of which are constituted by the very development of capitalist society;
Such an organization must be pursued by all the means the proletariat has at its disposal including universal suffrage ...
Marx argued that humans were necessarily dependent on one another, and upon nature. However, this dependence is felt by the individual as an imposition, and as powerlessness, unless it is voluntarily accepted as a means of self-realisation. For Marx, such voluntarism is only realisable when responsibility for the production of the means of life is assumed collectively. Such a state of affairs is socialism. Objectively, socialism becomes feasible insofar as production is spatially and temporally integrated under the influence of scientific knowledge and organisation. Subjectively, the modern working class becomes available as the agent of socialist transformation. Class consciousness arises from an innate desire to secure one's mode of subsistence. In history, producers have access to the means of subsistence either in a form dependent on the will of others, or independently, in the form of indefeasible property rights. Class consciousness always idealises independent proprietorship. This holds true for proletarians. However, as capitalism makes individual proprietorship impossible, only collective ownership appears to offer secure independence. This definition of Marx's theory brings into focus his examination of the problem of money wages. Income streams derived from the sale of labour power must be insecure if Marx's theory is to be robustly predictive of proletarian socialist preference formation. With this allowance made, Marx's theory is strikingly in accordance with historical data, and evidence gathered by social scientists.
I still think it's a pretty good take on the subject! Feel free to disagree.
Tuesday, 11 September 2012
What I hadn't realised was that that the displacement of the generalist had in the nineteenth-century given rise to such potent ideologies of frustration. Here's Kevin Passmore in his excellent Fascism: A Very Short Introduction:
[The late nineteenth-century] saw the emergence of modern disciplines in the universities: history, sociology, political science, physics, biology, literary criticism, and so on. The rise of professional, specialized research led to displacement of old-style scholars, sometimes amateurs, who claimed expertise in several fields. Lawyers and doctors, who had previously dominated university faculties, were especially likely to pretend to wide competence, and were attracted to ... racist, eugenicist, psychological, and historical ideas ...If any reviews of my book complain that it attempts to be too far-ranging, I'll be careful not to take the criticism to heart!
These polymaths often resented their lack of recognition from specialist professional academics, and compensated by seeking political success. Some favoured the extreme left (the legally trained Lenin was a quintessential generalist); others the new right. [Maurice] Barrès gave the [French] republican establishment's refusal to honour a now forgotten race theorist as a reason for entering politics. It is no accident that doctors and lawyers were prominent in the far right. Their resentment of specialists was coupled with fear that professions were overcrowded with Jews and women, and with dislike of government plans to introduce ‘socialist’ health-care programmes. Doctors and lawyers espoused eugenicist theories, which they thought gave them the right to play god. Specialist academics were often just as influenced by pseudo-scientific knowledge and nationalism. In pre-war ultranationalist movements specialists sometimes held sway, but generalists with chips on their shoulders increasingly set the agenda. [p. 38].